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DOMESTIC RELATIONS
DIVORCE-LIABILITY OF HUSBAND TO SUPPORT CHILD
AWARDED TO WIFE
Due to the aggression of her husband, a wife obtained a divorce
decree in 19oo which contained no provision for alimony or the support
of their minor child the custody of whom was awarded to the wife.
In 1941, upon the decease of her husband she submitted a bill for
necessaries furnished the adult child who had always been an incom-
petent. The court denied the wife relief holding the father was under
no legal obligation.'
The English common law recognized only a moral obligation for
the father to furnish necessaries to his minor children which could not
be enforced except by proceeding under St. 43 Eliz. c. 2.2 Despite the
fact that a third party could not recover against the father for neces-
saries,' a mother divorced and having custody of a child, was allowed
to sue for the child's support under the guise of her own necessaries.4
A few American jurisdictions follow the English reasoning and
absolve the father from liability even where there has been no separation
of the parents. Such cases hold that to allow any other conclusion would
be to deny the father the control of his own household, leaving him
powerless to protect himself from the extravagance of his children.'
Although the poor laws require contribution from the parent, it has been
held that these laws were intended only to indemnify the public against
the maintenance of paupers and not to reimburse third persons who
furnished goods on the father's credit.'
When a mother seeks to have a divorce decree modified in order to
provide for maintenance of a child in her custody, the reasons given by
the courts to deny relief vary. Some courts have said that the duty of
support is correlative with the right to the custody, services, society and
'Brunswick v. First-Central Trust Co., Exr., 66 Ohio App. 242 (594o), Ohio Bar
Mar. 17,19+1.
' MADDE.N, DOMESTIc RELATIONS (1931) p. 384.
aMortimore v. Wright 6 M. & W. 482 (i84o), Exch.; Shelton v. Springett, ii
C. B. 4.52 (085x), Blackburn v. Mackey, s Car. & P. a (1823) Abbot, C. J.-"The
question deeply affects society; for if persons in trade are allowed to trust young men, and
compel their fathers to pay them, any man who had a family might be ruined."
'Bazely v. Forder, L.R. 3 Q.B. 559 (1868).
'Gordon v. Potter, 57 Vt. 347 (1845); In re Ganey, 93 N. J. Eq. 389, x16 Ati.
x9 (1921) aff'd 9,- N. J. Eq. 5o2, 1x9 Atl. 925; White v. Mann, iio Ind. 74, lo N.E.
629 (z886); McConnell v. Lamontagne, 82 N.H. 423, 134 AtI. 718 (z926).
'Freeman v. Robinson, 38 N.J.L. 383, 2o Am. Rep. 399 (1876); Kelley v. Davis,
48 N.H. z87, 6 Am. Rep. 499 (5870).
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earnings of the child and once this is removed, the duty ceases,' or that
an award of the children to the mother accomplishes a transfer of
parental duties as well as rights.' It has also been held that the failure
of the mother to request aid in the divorce decree operates as an estoppel,'
for the law presumes that every question involved in the suit in which the
judgment was rendered was passed upon by the court, and that the
claim for maintenance was decided adversely to the wife.'"
The majority of courts in this country impose a duty on the father
to support a minor child, the duty persisting after the divorce. The courts
allow the decree to be modified whenever the circumstances of the case
require it." The reasons for the courts' conclusions differ. Some say
that the obligation arises out of the parental status alone," while others
recognize that it is more practical for the father to be the provider. 3
Some hold that a "natural duty" arises from the child's immaturity and
inability to care for itself.' 4 It has been said that the design of statutes
is to prevent the child from becoming a public charge.' 5 Some cases are
based on an implied contract in which the mother is considered the agent
of the father."C There are decisions which insist that the mother has no
right to incur expenses on the child's behalf until the father neglects or
'Husband v. Husband, 67 Ind. 583, 33 Am. Rep. 107 (1879) Weeks v. Morrow,
40 Me. 1S (i8SS)5 Iroquois Iron Co. v. Industrial Commission, 294 Il. zo6, 1z8 N.
E. 289, 12 A.L.R. 924 (1920) (child abandoned parent).
'Brown v. Smith, ig R.I. 319, 33 Atl. 466, 3o L.R.A. 68o, (I89S); Fitler v.
Fitler, 33 Pa. So (s8S9); Brow v. Brightman, 136 Mass. 187 (1883)i Hall v. Green,
87 Me. 122, 47 Am. St. Rep. 311, 32 Ati. 796 (s895).
Burritt v. Burritt, 29 Barb. (N.Y.) 124 (1859).
Dio Rich v. Rich, 88 Hun. 566, 34 N. Y. Supp. 854, 68 N. Y. St. Rep. 823 (1895).
' KF.ZER, Mlarriage and Divorce (zd ed. 1923) p. 419, 30 OHio Jun., Parent and
Child, Sec. 485 Poland v. Poland, 63 Wash. 597, 1s6 Pac. z (x9xs)5 Duvall v. Duvall,
z25 Iowa 24, 244 N.W. 718, 83 A.L.R. 1242 (93z) (foster child); Cordes v. Cordes,
8 Ohio Dec. 670, 37 Ohio Law Bull. zz5 (1896); Campbell v. Campbell, 14 Ohio L. Abs.
481 (1933) (the court saying that it had no jurisdiction to reduce amounts provided
for in agreement but could increase the same); Hoffman v. Hoffman, x5 Ohio St. 427
(1864); Monahan v. Monahan, 14 Ohio App. r16 (1919); Straub v. Straub, z9 Ohio
App. 373, 163 N.E. 590 (59z8); Heckert v. Heckert, 57 Ohio App. 4-zx, ii Ohio 0. 1i5,
14 N.E. (2d) 428 (1936).
1Johnson v. Latty, 210 Fed. 961 (I91z), (where remarriage of the mother did
not release the father from a duty to support a minor child); Spain v. Spain, 177 Iowa
249, iS8 N.W. 529, L.R.A. 1917D 319, Ann. Cas. 19xSE i225 (z9z6); Corbett v.
Corbett, 123 Ohio St. 76, 174 N.E. io (93o), aff'd xz9 Ohio St. 543 (193S); Barrett
v. Barrett, 44 Ariz. 509, 39 Pac. (2d) 62z (1934); 15 CORN. L.Q. 624 (1930).
'Porter v. Powell, 79 Iowa 151, 44 N.W. 295, 7 L.R.A. 176, iS Am. St. Rep.
353 (iSgo); Alvey v. Hartwig, so6 Md. 254, 67 At. 132, 11 L.R.A. (N.S.) 678, 14
Ann. Cas. 25o (1907).
"State ex rel Sherwood v. Sherwood, 13 Ohio App. 403, 32 Ohio C.A. 5s8 (19z).
' Schuman v. State, 6 Ohio N.P. 244, 9 Ohio Dec. 513 (1899).
" PARONS, CONTRACTS, Vol. I (9th ed. 1904) p. 307i Spencer v. Spencer, 97 Minn.
s6, io5 N.W. 483, z L.R.A. (N.S.) 8Sx, 14 Am. St. Rep. 695 (i9o6); Burgoyne v.
Smith, 19 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 75, 27 Ohio Dec. s6 (19s6); Barrett v. Barrett, 44 Ariz.
509, 39 Pac. (2d) 6z (934) supra not sz.
448 LAW JOURNAL-J UNE, 1941
refuses to make suitable provision for the child,"7 and that an express
contract may be a requisite or at least the mother must request that the
father furnish necessaries to the child.1 Earlier Ohio cases indicate that
a father is bound at his peril to know when his minor children need
further provision, and lack of notice will be no defense in an action of
neglect."
There is some question whether the duty is primarily the father's.
The tendency toward imposing equal liability on the wife is shown by
Ohio G. C. sec. 7997,20 cited by the court in the principal case, as well
as in Ohio G. C. sec. 10507-8.21 This thought is reiterated in Ohio G.
C. sec. 8032 defining the rights and duties of parents separated or
divorced.22 Despite the wording in the statutes, there is much authority
interpreting the duty as being primarily on the father.28 In Pretzinger v.
Pretzinger,2 a leading case, the court stated, "It is not the policy of the
law to deprive children of their rights on account of the dissensions of
their parents to which they are not parties; or to enable the father to
convert his own misconduct into a shield against parental liability."
'Hickman v. Hickman, 8 Ohio Dec. Rep. 6oz, 9 Ohio Law Bull. SS (1883);
Hackenburg v. Hackenburg, 17 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 456, 32 Ohio C.D. ZZ3 (1911) aff'd
88 Ohio St. 567 (2913).
' Christoff v. Christoff, 6 Ohio C.C. 52, 3 Ohio C.D. S6z (289z); Douglass v.
Douglass, zz Ohio C.C. 423, 2z Ohio C.D. 439, aff'd 45 Ohio Law Bull. 378 (z899)
(where divorce was due to the aggression of the mother); Harker v. Wolff, 4z Ohio
App. 540, iSz N.E. 59z (931) (but a provision had already been set for the child's
support).
19Moore v. State, z8 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 482, 24 Ohio C.D. 487 (igio); State v.
Teal, 77 Ohio St. 77, 83 N.E. 304 (1907).
"The husband must support himself, his wife, and his minor children out of his
property or by his labor. If he is unable to do so, the wife must assist him as far as
she is able."
"The wife and husband are the joint natural guardians of their minor children
and are equally charged with their care, nurture, welfare and education and the care
and management of their estates. The wife and husband shall have equal powers, rights,
and duties, and neither parent has any right paramount to the right of the other concern-
ing the custody of the minor or the control of the services or the earnings of such
minor, provided that if either parent, to the exclusion of the other, is maintaining and
supporting the child, such parent shall have the paramount right to control the services
and earnings of the child. Neither parent shall forcibly take a child from the guardian-
ship of the parent legally entitled to the custody."
"When a husband and wife are living separate and apart from each other or are
divorced and the question as to the care, custody, and control of the offspring of their
marriage is brought before a court of competent jurisdiction in this state, they shall stand
upon an equality as to the care, custody, and control of such offspring, so far as it
relates to their being either father or mother thereof."
ZMADDEN, DoMasTic RELArONS (1931) p. 383; Gully v. Gully, 284 S.W. 555;
aff'd 17z Tex. Z33, 231 S.W. 97, iS A.L.R. 564 (19zi); Young v. Young, 7 Ohio C.C.
(N.S.) 419, x8 Ohio C.D. 179 (igoS) (afterborn child)i Porter v. Powell, supra note 135
Sauer v. Sauer, 69 Ohio St. 539, 70 N.E. 1130 (9o); Alvey v. Hartwig, supra note 13;
Industrial Commission v. Drake, 203 Ohio St. 6z8, 134
. 
N.E. 465 (29zz); Craner v. State,
22 Ohio L.Abs. z6o (1936)i (1930) I5 CoRN. L.Q., 624-
2445 Ohio St. 452, 15 N.E. 471, 4Am. St. Rep. 542 (z895).
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Fulton v. Fulton" reached a contrary result, but may be distinguished
on the ground that the divorce was due to the aggression of the mother.
Quacre, whether this dictinction is based on equitable social policy?
If the ultimate liability is on the father, how long does it continue?
Ohio G. C. sec. 7997 refers to minor children. The termination of
such minority is fixed by statute at twenty-one years26 and the cases do
not modify this age limit.27 Criminal statutes23 set the penalty for
violation of the duty." The court in the principal case might have
afforded relief for period of the incompetent's minority had the mother
asked for the support money at an earlier date, 0 but the statute of
limitations had already run in the instant case.
Does an adult child, by virtue of his incompetency, occupy a different
status from other children past their minority? The problem must be
clarified in order to know whether charity or the male parent will carry
the burden. By statute in Ohio a parent is liable for support of a child
who is an inmate of a state institution. 3 In thirty jurisdictions it is pro-
vided that, if able, the parents are liable for the support of their poor
children who are unable to support themselves. These statutes are
applicable to indigent adult children 2 and allow suit by the institution
against the father's estate." California has a statute which permits an
adult child who is unable to support himself, to maintain an action of an
equitable nature against the parent to enforce the statutory liability.
8 4
The common law recognizes a father's duty to furnish necessaries to an
unmarried adult child who is permitted to remain in the father's home
5 z Ohio St. 229, 39 N.E. 729, 49 Am. St. Rep. 720, 29 A.L.R. 679 (1895).
23 Ohio G. C. sec. 8023.
a 30 OHIO JuL-, Parent and Child, Sec. 52; FzzER, Marriage and Divorce (2d ed.
1923) pp- 423; Breuer v. Dowden, 207 Ky. x2, z68 S.W. 541, 42 A.L.R. 146 (1925)
(where child subsequently became incompetent after reaching the age of majority); Van
Doren v. Eby, Dayton 411 (Ohio, 1872)i Thiessen v. Moore, 2o5 Ohio St. 401, 137 N.E.
906 (5922)5 Blake v. Blake, 20 Ohio L.Abs. 3 (x935); Mieszkalski v. Mieszkalski, 44-
Ohio App. 152, 284 N.E. 709, 37 Ohio Law Rep. 435 (1932)i i928 Opns. Atty. Gen.
2z8z.
, Ohio G.C. sec. x639-46i Ohio G.C. see. 13008; Ohio G.C. see. 22432; Ohio
G.C. sec. 22790.
' Schuman v. State, supra note I5; State v. Sanner, 81 Ohio St. 393, 9o N.E. 1007,
26 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1093 (i92o); State v. Stouffer, 65 Ohio St. 47, 6o N.E. 985 (igos);
Elem v. State, 5 Ohio App. 2z, 24 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 296, 26 Ohio C.D. 376 (i9s5);
Josh v. Josh, 22o Ohio St. 252, x6S N.E. 717 (1979).
Burgoyne v. Smith, supra note x6.
Ohio G.C. sec. 2815-9.
2 2 VERNIxR, AmtEFucAN FAIL s LAWS (2936) vol. 4, pp. 56.
'In re Weiss, 26 Pa. Dist. R. 143, 45 Pa. Co. Ct. 224 (1927); In re Harnish's
Estate, 268 Pa. iz8, 22o At. 76o (igo); In re Boles's Estate, 326 Pa. 279, 173 At.
664. (r934.)i but see In re Roberts' Estate, 30 Pa. Ct. 383 (904.) (recovery allowed
from mother's estate). Also 2935 Atty. Gen. Opns. 4558, and 2936 Atty. Gen. Opns.
535o (when in reference to detention hospitals the state must pay the whole expense).
Paxton v. Paxton, i5o Cal. 667, 89 Pac. 1083 (907).
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if the child is so weak mentally or physically as to be unable to support
himself.35 The reason for continuing liability in such a case is probably
based on the theory that since the father voluntarily assumed control and
custody of the child, he is also obligated to furnish support. Thus when
the child is removed from the father's home (by separation or divorce
of the parents), the father's duty ceases unless the courts can base the
responsibility on the fact of parentage alone, or upon the ground that
the father can best bear the expense. If the age of majority were set
not by rule of thumb but as a measure of dependency, the incompetent,
as a needy dependent, would still be owed a means of support. The
courts have been hesitant to accept this latter reasoning. In re Van Den-
burgh38 the court imposed liability on the father to pay the funeral
expenses of an incompetent child over twenty-one who was not living
in the father's home. The decision, however, was based on agency
doctrines since the father had authorized the mother to employ the
undertaker.
Possible deviations from precedent would be to determine the age of
majority as one of dependency, and then to allow the mother reimburse-
ment according to quasi-contract doctrines. Inasmuch as parents have
a legal obligation to support an adult child in a state institution, and with
the added factor that a father is primarily liable, the same duty could be
said to persist when the child is maintained in a private home. The court
in the principal case follows the great weight of authority but expresses
its reluctance in laying down an apparently harsh rule because of the
necessity of following existing statutory law.
H.G.
zo R.C.L. 586; 20 O1l1 JUa., Parent and Child, supra note z7; see Breuer v.
Dowden, supra note Z7 in which the court, speaking in dictum, said that if the child
had been ill when he became of age, the father might have been liable; Rowell v. Town
of Vershire, 6z Vt. 4o5, 39 At. 99o, 8 L.R.A. 7o8 (a8go); 928 Opns. Atty. Gen. zzSz,
supra note 27 (administrative officers were instructed to use their own discretion as to
supporting out of charity a blind young man whose father was able to support him);
Blake v. Blake, supra note 27 (no modification of a former decree for alimony was
permitted where an adult child was in an institution for the feebleminded); Cromwell
v. Benjamin, 41 Barb. (N.Y.) 558 (1863); Gilmanton v. Sanbornton, 56 N.H. 336
(876); Crain v. Mallone, 13o Ky. 125, 113 S.W. 67, zz L.R.A. (N.S.) is6S, 13z Am.
St. Rep. 355 (i9o8); Becker v. Industrial Commission, 137 Ohio St. 139, 17 Ohio 0. 478,
28 N.E. (zd) 361 (1940).
so 164 N. Y. Supp. 966, 178 App. Div. 237 (1917).
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